AppArmorLibvirtProfile

Summary

Virtual machines started by libvirt run unconfined. If there is a bug in the hypervisor, a guest could potentially attack other guests or the host. Providing an AppArmor profile would help protect against this. As of libvirt 0.6.1, sVirt has been merged and contains all the necessary hooks through a plugin architecture to confine a virtual machine, and includes an SELinux plugin. Providing an AppArmor plugin would help increase security and contain virtual machines in Ubuntu.

Release Note

Libvirt now contains AppArmor integration when using KVM or QEMU. Libvirtd is now configured to launch virtual machines that are confined by uniquely restrictive AppArmor profiles. This feature significantly improves virtualization in Ubuntu by providing user-space host protection as well as guest isolation.

Rationale

Virtual machines started by libvirt run unconfined. Since virtual machines with security bugs, misconfigured software or nefarious users could be deployed, it is imperative that the host machine is protected from attack by a malicious guest and guests be isolated from each other. Generally speaking, the hypervisor takes care of this isolation, however, bugs in the hypervisor may allow attackers to circumvent the hypervisor's protections.

AppArmor can increase security and help protect the host and isolate guests in the event of bugs in the hypervisor.

Design

When a virtual machine is started, determine if a profile is currently defined for the machine, and use it if available. If not, generate a new profile for the machine based on a template, which is by default a very restrictive profile allowing access to disk files, and anything else needed to run, such as the pid, monitor and log files.

Virtual machines should have a unique profile specific to that machine. To ensure uniqueness, the profile name will be derived from the UUID of the virtual machine. These profiles should be configurable, either by adjusting the profile template for new machines, creating/modifying the VM profile directly or through the use of AppArmor abstractions. This will allow for administrators to fine-tune confinement for individual machines if desired.

In addition to the above, initially confine libvirtd itself with a permissive (perhaps even complain-mode only) profile. libvirtd should not be allowed to create arbitrary profiles or modify profiles directly, so as to not allow libvirtd to potentially (ie via a security bug in libvirtd itself) bootstrap out of AppArmor confinement, should it be in a restrictive enforcing profile. Because root privileges are needed to manipulate AppArmor profiles, qemu:///session will not be supported at this time. As such, the implementation and profile must allow for a confined libvirtd with qemu:///session guests running unconfined.

Note that the upstream security plugin framework in libvirt 0.6.1 only works with qemu (and kvm), and not other technologies like Xen or OpenVZ. If and when these technologies are supported by the upstream framework, AppArmor confinement should work with them as well.

Implementation

  • Create an AppArmor plugin for libvirt using the security plugin framework provided by libvirt 0.6.1. Use aa_change_profile() from (sys/apparmor.h) in the hook for virExecWithHook(). This allows libvirtd to run in it's own profile and then change to a new profile in the kvm child after fork().

  • Provide a permissive libvirt AppArmor profile (/etc/apparmor.d/usr.sbin.libvirtd)

  • Provide a restrictive AppArmor abstraction for guest profiles to include (/etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/libvirt-qemu)

  • Provide a restrictive AppArmor template to be used when generating new profiles (/etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/TEMPLATE).

  • Write virt-aa-helper which libvirtd calls to create/update the profiles and load them. This application can create a profile based on TEMPLATE, load a profile, unload a profile and delete a profile.

  • Provide a restrictive AppArmor profile for virt-aa-helper (as part of /etc/apparmor.d/usr.sbin.libvirtd)

Blocked by

Test/Demo Plan

Please note that 9.04 packages for libvirt 0.6.1 will be supplied in a PPA. Due to bug #390810, the libvirtd profile must be in complain mode, and not enforcing (though virt-aa-helper and guests will be in enforce mode).

Packages for 9.10 are available in the Ubuntu archive.

libvirtd (daemon)

All of the libvirtd tests should be done with with AppArmor enabled (default install), with AppArmor not started (sudo /etc/init.d/apparmor stop) and with AppArmor disabled (boot with apparmor.enabled=0). Note that libvirtd will always need to be restarted if you change its profile from unconfined to complain/enforcing or vice-versa. All tests assume qemu:///system unless otherwise noted.

Test case

9.04

9.10

virsh capabilities (when enabled, should show apparmor secmodel under <host>)

pass

pass

virsh capabilities (security = 'none' in /etc/libvirt/qemu.conf, no secmodel under <host>)

NEEDED

pass

virsh create <xml> (when enabled, should show 'Security model: apparmor')

pass

pass

virsh define <xml> (when enabled, should show 'Security model: apparmor' after start)

pass

pass

virsh dominfo <guest> (when enabled, should show 'Security model: apparmor')1

pass

pass

virsh dumpxml <guest> (when enabled, should show <seclabel> section)1

pass

pass

virsh start <guest> (when enabled, should be confined, otherwise unconfined)2

pass

pass

virsh shutdown <guest> (when enabled, should unload the profile)2

pass

pass

virsh destroy <guest> (when enabled, should unload the profile)2

pass

pass

virsh -c qemu:///session start <guest> (should be unconfined)

pass

pass

virsh -c qemu:///session shutdown <guest>

pass

pass

virsh -c qemu:///session destroy <guest>

pass

pass

  1. needs to be started first
  2. use sudo aa-status

Guests

Test case

9.04

9.10

start confined libvirtd, guest without existing profile confined on start

pass

pass

start confined libvirtd, guest with existing profile confined on start

pass

pass

virsh dumpxml <guest> (when enabled, should show <seclabel> section)1

pass

pass

add a disk via virt-manager2

pass

pass

add a disk via virsh define2

pass

pass

uses a disk with '/./' or '/../' in the path3

pass

pass

uses a disk with symlink in the path3

pass

pass

uses a non-existent disk (should fail gracefully)

pass

pass4

hotplugging a disk (add a USB disk with virt-manager)

FAIL5

pass

add a CDROM iso

pass

pass

disconnect a connected CDROM iso2

pass

pass

install with virt-install

pass

pass

install with vmbuilder

pass

pass6

install with virt-manager and local ISO

pass

pass

install with virt-manager and local ISO with no storage

N/A

pass7

install with virt-manager and local cdrom

pass

pass

install with virt-manager and network tree

NEEDED

NEEDED

install with virt-manager and PXE (requires kvm-pxe)

NEEDED

pass

install with virt-manager and new volume from storage pool

N/A

pass

install with virt-manager and existing volume from storage pool

N/A

pass

install with virt-manager and local disk of varying sizes using full allocation

N/A

pass

install with virt-manager and local disk of varying sizes without using full allocation

N/A

pass

install with virt-manager with various OS types and Versions

N/A

pass8

install with virt-manager with various RAM allocations and CPUs

N/A

pass

virt-clone

pass

pass

add non-disk hardware to the guest

pass (added tablet)

pass (added generic usb mouse)

modifying hardware in the guest

pass (changed memory)

pass (changed memory)

default networking (NAT with dnsmasq)

pass

pass

bridged networking

pass

pass

USB passthrough

NEEDED

policy9

eucalyptus

NEEDED

pass

serial/console

NEEDED

pass

alternate kernel

NEEDED

pass

alternate initrd

NEEDED

pass

attach-device

NEEDED

pass10

detach-device

NEEDED

pass10

attach-disk

NEEDED

pass10

detach-disk

NEEDED

pass10

attach-disk (virtio)

NEEDED

pass10

detach-disk (virtio)

NEEDED

pass10

attach-disk (AoE/virtio)

NEEDED

pass11

detach-disk (AoE/virtio)

NEEDED

pass11

create with different os.type.arch than host architecture

NEEDED

pass12

suspend

NEEDED

pass

resume

NEEDED

pass

save

NEEDED

pass

restore

NEEDED

pass

migration

NEEDED

FAIL14

migration (live)

NEEDED

FAIL14

  1. guest may need to be started first
  2. disk is removed from /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvir-<uuid>.files on next machine boot

  3. AppArmor will normalize the path, virt-aa-helper should do the same

  4. fails as gracefully as libvirt 0.7.0 does (which is not very-- it waits for the monitor timeout instead of reporting the disk doesn't exist)
  5. in 9.04, /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvir-<uuid>.files is updated and the profile reloaded, but the disk doesn't work until reboot of guest.

  6. must use grub-legacy on the host due to bug #408739

  7. while initial install is ok, subsequent reboots don't work (no disks in the profile even though it is in the xml)
  8. test Linux/Hardy, Linux/Intrepid, Linux/Jaunty, Linux/Karmic, Generic/Generic, Other/MS-DOS, Windows/Vista, UNIX/FreeBSD 7.x
  9. this works fine if the profile allows it. Currently, a commented out section has been added to /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/libvirt-qemu that the user can uncomment if desired
  10. if attach-device/attach-disk during guest boot, then may trigger spurious AppArmor denied errors in the kernel. Disk is still available in the guest when this happens (bug #435527). Also, qemu-kvm bug #432154 may prevent this from working for all cases, but using libvirt with an older version works fine.

  11. requires host to have aoetools installed with access to a AoE disk. Requires acpiphp module loaded in the guest for hotplugging the device
  12. 448671 (fixed in 0.7.0-1ubuntu11). If using virt-manager with qemu, see 453495.

  13. 457716. This is upstream bug #529363. A workaround will be uploaded in an SRU for 9.10 until upstream fixes svirt relabelling.

  14. 461528. Note that to test this the diskfile needs to be in the same place on both machines (ideally on NFS) with the hostname of the target resolvable in DNS (ie 'nslookup `hostname`' should return something valid. This will be fixed in an SRU for 9.10

Hypervisors

The security plugin framework in libvirt 0.6.1 and higher currently only supports kvm/qemu and not xen, openvz, etc. When using a hypervisor that doesn't support the security driver, libvirt simply ignores the driver.

Test case

9.04

9.10

kvm (should be confined)

pass

pass

qemu (should be confined)

pass

pass

kvm from qemu-kvm (should be confined)

N/A

pass

qemu from qemu-kvm (should be confined)

N/A

pass

kqemu (should be confined)

pass

N/A

  1. kqemu is no longer available in Ubuntu 9.10

Remote vs local

Please note that if testing this on a virtual machine, you'll need to change the virtual machine's libvirt network configuration like so:

$ virsh net-dumpxml default | sed 's/192.168.122/192.168.123/g' > /tmp/foo.xml
$ virsh net-define /tmp/foo.xml
$ virsh net-destroy default
$ virsh net-start default

Otherwise, you will lose network connectivity in the guest.

Test case

9.04

9.10

unconfined client runs virsh -c qemu+ssh://<confined host>/system capabilities (shows apparmor secmodel under <host>)

pass

pass

unconfined client runs virsh -c qemu+ssh://<confined host>/system dominfo <guest> (has 'Security model: apparmor')1

pass

pass

unconfined client runs virsh -c qemu+ssh://<confined host>/system dumpxml <guest> (has seclabel)1

pass

pass

unconfined client starts guest on remote host with AppArmor (remote guest is confined)

pass

pass

unconfined client shuts down guest on remote host with AppArmor (profile removed)

pass

pass

unconfined client destroys guest on remote host with AppArmor (profile removed)

pass

pass

confined client2 runs virsh -c qemu+ssh://<unconfined host>/system capabilities (no security driver)

pass

pass

confined client2 runs virsh -c qemu+ssh://<unconfined host>/system dominfo <guest> (no security model)

pass

pass

confined client2 runs virsh -c qemu+ssh://<unconfined host>/system dumpxml <guest> (no seclabel)

pass

pass

confined client2 starts guest on remote host without AppArmor

pass

pass

confined client2 shuts down guest on remote host without AppArmor

pass

pass

confined client2 destroys guest on remote host without AppArmor

pass

pass

unconfined client runs virsh -c qemu+ssh://<unconfined host>/system capabilities (no security driver)

pass

pass

unconfined client runs virsh -c qemu+ssh://<unconfined host>/system dominfo <guest> (no security model)

pass

pass

unconfined client runs virsh -c qemu+ssh://<unconfined host>/system dumpxml <guest> (no seclabel)

pass

pass

unconfined client starts guest on remote host without AppArmor (remote guest is unconfined)

pass

pass

unconfined client shuts down guest on remote host without AppArmor

pass

pass

unconfined client destroys guest on remote host without AppArmor

pass

pass

virsh -c qemu+tcp://<confined host>/system list

NEEDED

FAIL3

  1. guest may need to be started first
  2. 'confined client' means AppArmor is enabled on this host, not that virsh has a profile

  3. 462000 (profiling bug to be fixed in 9.10 SRU). Adjust libvirt.conf to have listen_tls = 0 and listen_tcp = 1 then start libvirtd with --listen. If prompted for a password, then it worked.

Upstream bugs

Other investigations

These haven't been tested, but should be considered:

  • vde (per Soren and Dustin, not supported)
  • storage pools (per Soren, not a problem)

Unresolved issues

qemu:///session is not supported because libvirtd is started as a non-root user and cannot write and load AppArmor profiles.

Submit upstream

Accepted by upstream:


CategorySpec

SecurityTeam/Specifications/Karmic/AppArmorLibvirtProfile (last edited 2011-05-04 13:55:02 by pool-71-114-233-7)